Raftoprisen 2018: Minoritetsrettigheter og domstolens uavhengighet i Polen

Injuria.no • 5. oktober 2018

Skrevet av Lana Zaychenko
 


"Chain of Lights" protest i Gdynia mot domstolsreformen. Foto: Paweł Filar

Årets pris gikk til den polske ombudsmannen og menneskerettskommisæren Adam Bodnar, som kjemper for minoritetsrettigheter og domstolens uavhengighet, samtidig som Polen er saksøkt etter brudd på EUs kjerneverdier.
 

Siden 1987 har Raftostiftelsen utgitt en årlig pris for å fremme menneskeverd rundt om i verden. Stiftelsen ble opprettet til minne for Norges Handelhøgskoles professor Thorolf Rafto, som var en politisk- og menneskerettslig aktivist i Øst-Europa. Han døde som følge av politiets mishandling i Praha og stiftelsen ble opprettet samme år for å erkjenne hans arbeid. Prisen har høy status i dag og fire Raftoprisvinnere har senere også mottatt Nobels fredspris.

I år er Raftoprisen tildelt en menneskerettsforkjemper fra et naboland hvor regjeringspartiet får stadig mer kontroll over lovgivende, utøvende og til og med dømmende makt. Hva er det som skjer i Polen nå, og hva er ombudsmann Adam Bodnars rolle i det hele?
 

“Tilbakegangen i demokrati og menneskerettighetsbeskyttelse i Polen” [1]

Den 25. oktober 2015 fikk Polen et nytt parlament hvor 51 prosent av plassene (235 av 460) gikk til Lov og Rettferdighetspartiet (PiS). I august samme år ble PiS’ representant Andrzej Duda utnevnt som Polens president. Partiets nasjonalkonservative politikk og spesielt avgjørelsene om den dømmende makt har tiltrukket mer og mer av EUs oppmerksomhet siden 2015.

EU-kommisjonen uttalte seg i desember om situasjonen i Polen, og allerede da var det oppsummert at myndighetene i løpet av to år har vedtatt “mer enn 13 lover som påvirker rettssystemet (the entire structure of the justice system)” [2] . Det omfattende nye lovverket utvider PiS’ kontroll fra den lovgivende og den utøvende makt overfor landets domstoler. I juli 2018 ble det vedtatt en lov som tvangspensjonerer omtrent halve den polske Høyesterett, inkludert justitiarius Malgorzata Gersdorf som etter det gamle regelverket ikke ville gått av før i 2020.
 

Reaksjoner fra EU (og mer)

PiS’ inngrep i den dømmende makt fikk sterk kritikk fra EU, blant annet fra Europakommisjonen, FNs høykommissær for menneskerettigheter, Den europeiske kommisjonen for demokrati gjennom lovgiving (Veneziakommisjonen) og OSCE (Kontoret for demokratiske institusjoner og menneskerettigheter). 

På grunn av gjentatte ganger å ha ignorert EUs råd og varsler ble Polen saksøkt den 24. september i år for brudd på EU-traktatens [3] artikkel 7. Artikkelens formål er å sikre at EUs kjerneverdier som “frihed, demokrati, ligestilling, retsstaten og respekt for menneskerettighederne”, jf. EU-traktaten art. 2, er ivaretatt av medlemslandene. Ved grov overtredelse av “de værdier” kan et land fratas sin stemmerett etter en enstemmig beslutning, men det vil mest sannsynlig ikke skje med Polen, sett at Ungarn har sagt at de vil støtte Polen skulle forslaget komme opp til avstemning.

Sanksjonene kommer ikke bare fra EU-kommisjonen, men også fra Det Europeiske nettverket av domstoladministrasjoner (ENCJ). ENCJ har som formål å fremme rettssikkerheten [4] blant EUs medlemsland, hvor minstekravet for deltakelse er at nasjonens domstoler forblir uavhengige. For brudd på dette kravet har ENCJ 17. september suspendert Polen fra organisasjonen. [5]

Situasjonen berører også mange utenfor EU - blant annet har Mick Jagger (74) uttalt seg under en av sine sommerkonserter i Warszawa om at han allerede er “too old to be a judge. But I am young enough to sing.” [6] Også Pearl Jam har støttet polske kvinner i deres kamp mot abortforbud. [7]


Ombudsmann mot PiS


Adam Bodnar under konferanse "Democracy and Human Rights" i polsk Senat. Foto:Michał Józefaciuk

Adam Bodnar var utnevnt som Polens syvende ombudsmann for menneskerettigheter like før det nye parlamentet fikk makten i 2015. Ombudsmannen og dens kontor arbeider med evaluering av ny lovgivning, sikrer at nye lover står i samsvar med Polens konstitusjon og gir uavhengige ekspertuttalelser og rapporter. Fra begynnelsen av fokuserte Bodnar særlig på beskyttelse av rettigheter til sårbare grupper og minoriteter: migranter, kvinner, etniske og seksuelle minoriteter samt personer med funksjonshemminger.

I den nåværende politiske situasjonen jobber Bodnar aktivt både med å fremme rettferdighet for dem som trenger den mest og for å sikre at den uavhengige rettferdigheten finnes. Han har sterkt kritisert myndighetenes maktsentralisering:

The Polish government is concentrating power in its hands, subordinating public media, the secret services and the prosecutor’s office. The independence of the judiciary has already been badly damaged. Due to changes implemented in last two years the Constitutional Court has lost its  ability to effectively control legislation of political importance”

Bodnars stemme er viktig i Polen og den sympatiserer ikke med PiS. Ombudsmannens engasjement førte til en forverring av forholdet med myndighetene; nedgangen begynte med kritikk, fortsatte med personlige trusler og nå kan spørsmålet handle om hele ombudsmannskontorets tilstedeværelse.
 

“Det er viktig å stå opp for minoriteter og svakere grupper, samt forhindre politisering av rettssystemet, særlig når det skjer i et EU-land som Norge har mange forbindelser til”, mener Helle Mai Hagen, leder av Raftos studentgruppe og medlem av årets priskomité.

Priskomiteens begrunnelse  understreker at angrep på domstolenes uavhengighet er uakseptabelt og oppfordrer polske myndigheter å ratifisere en rekke konvensjoner og tilleggsprotokoller som fremmer rettigheter til de svakeste gruppene. I særposisjon står en uttalelse om Polens internasjonale menneskerettighetsforpliktelser som krever at staten tilrettelegger ombudsmannens arbeid “via tilgang til informasjon, finansiering og uavhengighet.”

Prisen ligger på 20.000 USD. Som embetsmann kan Bodnar ikke motta penger, og Raftostiftelsen skal utvelge noen i Polens sivile samfunn som støtter menneskerettighetsarbeid til å motta prisen. 

 


[1] Rafto Foundation of Human Rights.  Award statement 27.09.2018  https://www.rafto.no/assets/news/Award-Statement-ENG-2018.pdf

[2] European Commission.  Rule of Law: European Commission acts to defend judicial independence in Poland 20.12.2017  http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-5367_en.htm

[3] EUR-Lex.  Konsolideret udgave af

traktaten om Den europæiske union  https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/DA/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12016M/TXT&from=EN

[4] European Network of Councils for the Judiciary.  Strategic plan 2018 - 2021  https://www.encj.eu/strategic-plan

[5] European Network of Councils for the Judiciary.  Position Paper of the Board of the ENCJ on the membership of the KRS of Poland  https://pgwrk-websitemedia.s3.eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/production/pwk-web-encj2017-p/News/ENCJ%20Board%20position%20paper%20on%20KRS%20Poland.pdf

[7] Poland in English.  Pearl Jam supports Polish women fighting against abortion restrictions  https://polandinenglish.info/37943973/pearl-jam-supports-polish-women-fighting-against-abortion-restrictions

 

Av Hannah M. Behncke, Eylül Sahin and Sabrina Eriksen Zapata – ELSA Bergen, Human Rights, Researchgruppen 24. april 2025
Oppression isn’t always loud - it can be the quiet erasure of culture and language, stripping minorities of their freedom to express who they are. Language and culture are two of the most important means to keep one's identity alive. Unfortunately, many minorities face extreme repression regarding their background. The Kurdish ability to perform their culture in Turkey has been a long struggle. This is still the case today, where the Kurdish minority face backlash for speaking their language. This article will look into the Kurdish fight to protect their identity in Turkey. To gain a deeper understanding of the diverse perspectives on this issue, we interviewed a Kurdish and a Turkish citizen of Turkey about their views on the Turkish state's treatment of Kurds. Legal basis Although several international legal frameworks exist to protect minority cultures and languages, Turkey has not incorporated them into its legal system. Article 27 of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights explicitly states that “minorities shall not be denied the right […] to enjoy their culture, [...] or to use their own language.” However, despite ratifying the ICCPR, Turkey made a reservation excluding Article 27. Similarly, the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages requires minority languages to be accessible in education, judicial court proceedings, and in the media. However, Turkey has not ratified this charter. Domestically, the Turkish constitution does not recognize Kurds as a minority. In fact, article 42 explicitly prohibits the “teaching of any language other than Turkish as a mother tongue to Turkish citizens”.1 As a result, the Kurdish language lacks legal protection, unlike Ladino, Greek, and Armenian, which are safeguarded under the Treaty of Lausanne (1923).2 Historical overview After the Ottoman Empire's collapse, the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres promised Kurdish autonomy, but the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne nullified it, dividing Kurdistan among Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria without self-rule.3 Under Atatürk, Turkey enforced homogenization, banning Kurdish in public, closing Kurdish schools, renaming villages (1924) and forcibly relocating Kurds—even though most Kurds did not speak Turkish.4 The state criminalized Kurdish, promoted Citizen, Speak Turkish! and justified relocations as a tool to suppress identity.5 The Sheikh Sa’id Rebellion (1925), led by Kurdish nationalists and Islamists, was brutally crushed, triggering long-term conflict. Martial law and mass deportations lasted until 1939, while uprisings in Ararat (1930) and Dersim (1937–38) faced massacres, bombings, and poison gas, drawing parallels to the Armenian Genocide.6 Allegations of British support for Kurdish rebels persist, but remain debated.7 Kurdish political movements resurfaced in the 1960s and 1970s, with the Kurdish Democratic Party of Turkey (1965) and the Marxist-Leninist PKK (1978) engaging in armed resistance. Turkey designated the PKK a terrorist group in 1997, followed by the US and EU.8 Forced displacement continued, with over a million Kurds migrating between 1950 and 1980 due to state violence and poverty.9 The 1980 military coup further suppressed Kurdish politics, banning education (1982) and publications (Law No. 2932, 1983).10 Despite lifting the language ban in 1991, Kurdish broadcasting remained illegal until 2002. From 1984 to 1999, Turkey destroyed 4,000 Kurdish villages, displaced three million people, and killed tens of thousands in its campaign against Kurdish insurgency.11 The 1991 language bill allowed limited private Kurdish use, but public use remained restricted. Some progress followed in the 21st century, including Kurdish-language broadcasts (2004), a state-run TV channel (2009), and Kurdish as an optional school subject (2012), though full linguistic and cultural rights remain elusive. Oral storytelling (Dengbêj) persisted despite restrictions. Between 2013 and 2015, Turkey’s peace talks with the PKK, involving Abdullah Öcalan, PKK commanders, and pro-Kurdish HDP intermediaries, collapsed—renewing conflict in southeastern Turkey.12 Arbitrary arrests, imprisonment, torture, and land dispossession persist, as security forces often fail to distinguish civilians from PKK members.13 How is the situation today? An estimated 12–20 million Kurds live in Turkey, making up approximately 14–23% of the country's population. The wide range in estimates is due to the absence of ethnicity-related data in official statistics and the social and political stigma that may lead some to conceal their identity.14 As Kurds originate from various countries, most today identify with the state in which they reside. Surveys suggest that many Kurds feel a strong sense of discrimination. Only 28% believe they are treated equally to ethnic Turks, while 58% report experiencing discrimination. Some have even been denied medical services and housing due to their ethnicity.15 To better understand these challenges, we spoke with a Kurdish individual from Elbistan, Turkey, who spent most of his life there before relocating. When asked if he had ever felt pressure speaking Kurdish in public, he recalled visits to public institutions where his family, unable to speak Turkish, had to use Kurdish, but were not allowed to. “It always made us feel fear and anxiety”, he said. He also described restrictions on Kurdish culture: “Whenever we listened to Kurdish music or played traditional games outside, we knew we were being watched. Some of my friends were even detained just for playing games with Kurdish music. It felt like our culture was a crime.” In contrast, a Turkish conservative nationalist offered a different perspective. While personally holding nationalist views, he answered the questions in general terms, arguing that Kurds are integrated into society and do not face systemic barriers. When asked if there was tension between Turks and Kurds in daily life, he dismissed the idea: “Generalizing Turkey’s sociology is difficult, but I don’t see any real barrier. I have Kurdish friends and colleagues, and background doesn’t matter to us. In cities like Istanbul, people aren’t judged based on race, religion, language, or culture.” Even though he acknowledged past discrimination, he viewed it as a historical issue rather than an ongoing one. While the two perspectives differ, they reflect broader discussions on the extent of cultural and linguistic inclusion in Turkey. Surveys suggest that many Kurds report experiencing discrimination, while some view Kurdish cultural expression as unrestricted. The extent to which Kurdish identity is freely expressed - or whether challenges remain - continues to be a subject of debate. The survival of Kurdish culture in Turkey In a survey conducted regarding Kurdish identity, only 30% of Kurds reported their Kurdish language skills to be “good”, and of this 30%, only 44% of them reported that their children had the same strong language skills.16 This suggests that it is harder for each passing generation to maintain and teach the Kurdish language. So how has the oppression impacted Kurdish ability to maintain their language? According to the latter interviewee “Kurdish is spoken openly, cultural traditions are practiced, and there are Kurdish-language newspapers and TV channels”. Media As mentioned above, the Turkish government continuously violates the “freedom of expression”. In 2021, Turkey was the country with most cases regarding violation to “freedom of expression” before the European Court of Human Rights.17 Regarding Kurdish media, there has been a consistent crackdown on Kurdish media platforms. There has also been consistent imprisonment of journalists either writing in Kurdish or regarding Kurdish repression. For instance, Nedim Turfent was sentenced to 8 years imprisonment in 2017 for covering the clashes between the Turkish army and the PKK. In his sentence, he was charged with “membership of a terrorist organization”.18 Education The Educational accessibility to teaching Kurdish has improved in the years. Students in cities with a high population of Kurds, can choose Kurdish as a subject in primary- and secondary school. In addition, some state level universities offer Kurdish programs. However, these educational means have been greatly criticized by Kurdish activists, in regard to the government lowering the quality of education by not supplying enough teachers and appropriate materials needed for the classes.19 Final remarks Language is not just a means of communication; it embodies history, culture, and identity. The Kurdish struggle for linguistic freedom in Turkey is a fight for existence, where legal barriers and social stigmas persist despite claims of progress. While the government insists on inclusivity, Kurdish activists highlight ongoing repression, and for many, fear and anxiety remain. The future of Kurdish identity depends not just on legal reforms but on broader acceptance within Turkish society. Whether true equality is within reach - or remains a distant hope - ultimately depends on who you ask.
Av Injuria 24. april 2025
I denne utgaven: Nordtveit, Ernst - " Rettar til nausttomt " - 1982