Restrictions on the right to vote for convicted felons in the U.S.

Injuria.no • 8. desember 2024

By:  Hannah M. Behncke, Mathea Kristoffersen, Camila Salazar Larsen, Selma Zachariassen Nasby, Eylül Sahin, Sabrina Eriksen Zapata - ELSA Bergen, Human Rights Researchgruppen.

This article was written and finished on November 5th, right before the beginning of the presidential elections. It is an expression of the authors' views. 

 

This fall, the presidential election in the United States of America has gotten a lot of attention. This topic is relevant not only through its political aspect, but also the legal one and its implications on democracy. In this article, an overview over how a felony conviction can affect Americans voting rights will be presented.

 

An overview of the U.S.

Disenfranchisement, or voter disqualification, refers to the restriction of a person's right to vote. [1]

The United States has a federal system in which the states have two political authorities to adhere to, the national and subnational. It is the subnational level which regulates the right to vote for convicted felons. In some cases, felon disenfranchisement is permanent, whilst in other cases voting rights are restored after a former felon has completed probation, parole or served a sentence.

The legitimacy behind restricting convicted felons' right to vote comes from the Richardson v. Ramirez 1974 case. In 1972 Aban Ramirez sued the state of California, and challenged the state’s laws that permanently removed a convicted felons right to vote. The California Supreme Court agreed that this law was unconstitutional, however on appeal to the Supreme Court of the United State the decision was overturned. This meant that convicted felons could be prohibited from voting after completing their sentence and parole, without violating the “Equal Protection Clause” of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. This specific case has been used in the US as a means of legitimizing disenfranchisement.  [2]

American policies regarding felony disenfranchisement have historically been so restrictive that the United Nations Human Rights Commission in 2006 condemned the US for violating international law regarding universal suffrage. [3] Whilst there has been a growing trend of restoring voting rights for convicted felons, the table below displays the limitations still imposed on convicted felons in the different American states. [4]

 

 

Problematics of Disenfranchisement

Around the world, there are many legal instruments establishing that punitive measures should go hand in hand with rehabilitation measures, so that individuals with a felony record can integrate back into society once their sentence is done. In particular, for our case of analysis, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in article 10 (3) states that rehabilitation is one of the main objectives of a prison sentence. Although the U.S. ratified the aforementioned instrument in 1992, it did so with reservations to avoid conflict with national law. As mentioned before, historically, the U.S.  has had a more punitive approach in their prison system, [5] but new laws that seek to change this scenario have been recently put into force at a national and federal level. For example The Second Chance Act (2008), The Fair Sentencing Act  (2010), and The First Step Act (2018), seek the adequate reinsertion of convicts providing programs related to education, employment, and treatment of addictions.

However, an essential component of reinsertion into society requires participation in civic spaces, which includes the possibility to vote and choose your representatives. According to the United Nations, a “ civic space is the environment that enables people and groups (...) to participate meaningfully in the political, economic, social and cultural life in their societies (...) Any restrictions on such a space must comply with international human rights law.. [6] It seems rather contradictory that once an individual has complied with a felony sentence, and should then be ready to reintegrate into society, the person is still unable to participate in one of the most important processes one can find in a democracy. The aforementioned perpetuates exclusion and social discrimination, that ends up in a second-class citizenship. [7]

Furthermore, the voting bans on convicted felons are disproportionately placed on minorities, and especially on African Americans. There are 2% of adults in America at-large who cannot vote due to these bans, but this percentage is at 5% for African Americans, and at 1,5% for other groups of the population. [8] This shows that African Americans have a smaller opportunity than other groups in American society to elect people that best represent their interest, and more importantly, they have less of a chance to take part in their own democracy.

According to "The Sentencing Project", 4 million Americans do not have the right to vote in the 2024 election. [9] Although this number has declined by 31% since 2016, it is still a big issue, for example in elections with narrow winner margins.  In the 2000 Presidential Election, the margin between Al Gore and George W. Bush in the popular vote was 540,000, which clearly demonstrates that a disenfranchisement population of 4 million might be enough to tip the scales between two candidates. At the state level, this margin is even smaller. In the 2020 Presidential Election, Joe Biden won the state of Georgia with a majority of only approximately 12 000 votes. [10] Georgia does not allow convicted felons to vote during their prison time, their parole or during probation. This leads to a total of almost 250 000 people being disenfranchised in Georgia today, a percentage of 3,25 %. [11] Consequently, the rate of disenfranchisement weakens democracy. 

Moreover, it must be stated that felon disenfranchisement only restricts the right to vote, but convicted felons are still expected to participate in education or employment and pay the corresponding taxes, as any citizen is obliged to. As has been established by experts, taxation without representation contradicts the founding principles of the United States since the American Revolution, making the denial of governmental access while imposing taxes an urgent need of correction. [12] This prohibition causes a lack of fairness and accountability because taxpayers do not have a say on how the money will be spent, making individuals subject to policies and budgets they might not agree with. 

 

Issues that arise even if there was a right to vote

Other than the problems connected to the legal eligibility to vote, there are remaining practical obstacles hindering the voting access for convicted felons. The first big obstacle is general voter confusion. The laws regulating voting access differ from each state and are frequently being changed. In addition, there have been several instances where governors have been issuing conflicting executive orders, and then rolling them back. A U.S commission on Civil rights also showed that correction officers frequently don’t provide information to returning citizens about their voting rights. [13] Seen in light of the fact that many states prosecute people trying to vote when they don’t realize they aren’t eligible to do so, the risk could be seen as too high for a lot of voters.

Another obstacle for voting is that many states require various forms of documentation in order to vote. Other than the fact that getting the documentation in itself could be a long process, the conditions for getting the paperwork could be problematic. As an example, getting the voter rights certificate in Louisiana demands that the applicant has not been incarcerated for the last five years. [14] In many states the returning citizen only has a right to vote after paying a list of legal financial obligations. It’s not to be argued that people returning to society after long convictions often don’t have a stable economy. As an example of this issue, about one third of applications for rights restorations in Alabama are denied due to debts to the courts. [15] Lastly, some other obstacles could be directly connected to the serving of jailtime itself. Logistical hurdles, lack of voting opportunities, learning and meeting the deadlines for voting, getting an ID etc. could represent further hurdles. 

 

A european perspective 

Prisoners' right to vote in Europe falls under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 of the Convention, which ensures the right to free elections. This right is vital to a functioning democracy, [16] as “ justice cannot stop at the prison gate ”. [17]

Additionally, Mironescu v. Romania affirms a strong European consensus that detainees should retain the right to vote. [18] This provision is however not absolute, and member states have some discretion to restrict this right. [19]

The Court has established that a blanket ban on voting for all prisoners, regardless of the offence, is incompatible with the Convention. Personal circumstances, [20] particularly for those with intellectual or mental disabilities, must be considered with thorough judicial scrutiny. [21]

The deprivation of voting rights should be exceptional, determined by a judge on a case-by-case basis with a clear link between the offence and democratic institutions to ensure proportionality. [22] However, it is important to note that the absence of judicial oversight does not necessarily imply a blanket restriction, as a well-defined legal framework may suffice. [23]

Prisoners' voting rights in Europe remain vulnerable, as evidenced by the 2022 judgement in Kalda v. Estonia (No. 2), which upheld a general ban on voting for prisoners. The Court ruled that national courts had appropriately assessed the measure's proportionality on a case-by-case basis. This ruling facilitates increased restrictions, enabling states to justify general bans based on assessments of inmates’ dangerousness.

The emphasis on prison security and negative public attitudes undermine prisoners' voting rights, which the Court highlighted as vital for resocialization and reintegration in Viola v. Italy (No. 2).

Challenges such as access to information, political propaganda, and voting organizations hinder the effective exercise of this right. [24]
 

Final remarks

The exclusion of felons from voting in the U.S. raises issues related to justice, representation, democracy and reintegration. Although recent developments support restoring voting rights, significant practical and legal barriers still exist. Comparisons with international norms suggest that U.S. policies are unusually restrictive.


 


[2] Staufenbeil, Kiley (2020) "With Liberty and Justice for Some: How Felony Disenfranchisement Undermines American Democracy," Themis: Research Journal of Justice Studies and Forensic Science: Vol. 8 , Article 6. https://doi.org/10.31979/THEMIS.2020.0806 https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/themis/vol8/iss1/6

[5] Chapter 5 The Sprawling Punitive Turn, 1993–2001 Michael S. Sherry

https://doi.org/10.5149/northcarolina/9781469660707.003.0006 Pages 131–172 Published: December 2020

[6] European Union. (2024). European Union Agency for Fundamental Right. Civil society and the Fundamental Rights Platform.  https://fra.europa.eu/sq/cooperation/civil-society/civil-society-space

[8] Christopher Uggen, Ryan Larson, Sarah Shannon, and Robert Stewart, “Locked Out 2022: Estimates of People Denied Voting Rights,” sentencingproject.org

[10] CNN, https://edition.cnn.com/election/2020/results/state/georgia

[11] The Sentencing Project, 2024

[13] Un commission on civil rights, June 2019, Collateral Consequences: The Crossroads of Punishment, Redemption, and the Effects on Communities . Retrieved november 4th 2024.

[14] Human rights watch (2024). Out of step, US policy on voting rights in a global perspective. Human rights watch.  Retrieved 04.11.2024 from 

https://www.hrw.org/report/2024/06/27/out-step/us-policy-voting-rights-global-perspective

[15] U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, pg. at pg. 118.

[16] ECHR, Thematic Note – Voting Rights of Inmates. December 2022.

[17] ECtHR, Campbell and Fell v. United Kingdom, no. 7819/77, para. 69.

[18] ECtHR, no° 17504/18, para. 43 and 52

[19] ECtHR, Kalda v. Estonia (n°2), n°14581/20, para. 39.

[20] CtHR, Scoppola v. Italy (n°3), n°126/05.

[21] Dalloz Report, 2013, p. 2174, Prisoners' Right to Vote: Conviction of Turkey, Judgment by the European Court of Human Rights, No. 29411/07.

[22] ECtHR, Frodl v. Austria, n°20201, and Cases like Hirst v. United Kingdom and Scoppola v. Italy have highlighted the limits of state discretion in this area.

[23] Olivier Bachelet, “Voting Rights of Prisoners: The Strasbourg Compromise”, Comment on ECHR, Grand Chamber, 22 May 2012, Scoppola v. Italy (No. 3) , No. 126/05 in Dalloz News, 15 june 2012

[24] Élise Boulineau, “Convicted people’s right: a matured right?”, RFDA 2024, p. 125.

 

 

Av Hannah M. Behncke, Eylül Sahin and Sabrina Eriksen Zapata – ELSA Bergen, Human Rights, Researchgruppen 24. april 2025
Oppression isn’t always loud - it can be the quiet erasure of culture and language, stripping minorities of their freedom to express who they are. Language and culture are two of the most important means to keep one's identity alive. Unfortunately, many minorities face extreme repression regarding their background. The Kurdish ability to perform their culture in Turkey has been a long struggle. This is still the case today, where the Kurdish minority face backlash for speaking their language. This article will look into the Kurdish fight to protect their identity in Turkey. To gain a deeper understanding of the diverse perspectives on this issue, we interviewed a Kurdish and a Turkish citizen of Turkey about their views on the Turkish state's treatment of Kurds. Legal basis Although several international legal frameworks exist to protect minority cultures and languages, Turkey has not incorporated them into its legal system. Article 27 of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights explicitly states that “minorities shall not be denied the right […] to enjoy their culture, [...] or to use their own language.” However, despite ratifying the ICCPR, Turkey made a reservation excluding Article 27. Similarly, the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages requires minority languages to be accessible in education, judicial court proceedings, and in the media. However, Turkey has not ratified this charter. Domestically, the Turkish constitution does not recognize Kurds as a minority. In fact, article 42 explicitly prohibits the “teaching of any language other than Turkish as a mother tongue to Turkish citizens”.1 As a result, the Kurdish language lacks legal protection, unlike Ladino, Greek, and Armenian, which are safeguarded under the Treaty of Lausanne (1923).2 Historical overview After the Ottoman Empire's collapse, the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres promised Kurdish autonomy, but the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne nullified it, dividing Kurdistan among Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria without self-rule.3 Under Atatürk, Turkey enforced homogenization, banning Kurdish in public, closing Kurdish schools, renaming villages (1924) and forcibly relocating Kurds—even though most Kurds did not speak Turkish.4 The state criminalized Kurdish, promoted Citizen, Speak Turkish! and justified relocations as a tool to suppress identity.5 The Sheikh Sa’id Rebellion (1925), led by Kurdish nationalists and Islamists, was brutally crushed, triggering long-term conflict. Martial law and mass deportations lasted until 1939, while uprisings in Ararat (1930) and Dersim (1937–38) faced massacres, bombings, and poison gas, drawing parallels to the Armenian Genocide.6 Allegations of British support for Kurdish rebels persist, but remain debated.7 Kurdish political movements resurfaced in the 1960s and 1970s, with the Kurdish Democratic Party of Turkey (1965) and the Marxist-Leninist PKK (1978) engaging in armed resistance. Turkey designated the PKK a terrorist group in 1997, followed by the US and EU.8 Forced displacement continued, with over a million Kurds migrating between 1950 and 1980 due to state violence and poverty.9 The 1980 military coup further suppressed Kurdish politics, banning education (1982) and publications (Law No. 2932, 1983).10 Despite lifting the language ban in 1991, Kurdish broadcasting remained illegal until 2002. From 1984 to 1999, Turkey destroyed 4,000 Kurdish villages, displaced three million people, and killed tens of thousands in its campaign against Kurdish insurgency.11 The 1991 language bill allowed limited private Kurdish use, but public use remained restricted. Some progress followed in the 21st century, including Kurdish-language broadcasts (2004), a state-run TV channel (2009), and Kurdish as an optional school subject (2012), though full linguistic and cultural rights remain elusive. Oral storytelling (Dengbêj) persisted despite restrictions. Between 2013 and 2015, Turkey’s peace talks with the PKK, involving Abdullah Öcalan, PKK commanders, and pro-Kurdish HDP intermediaries, collapsed—renewing conflict in southeastern Turkey.12 Arbitrary arrests, imprisonment, torture, and land dispossession persist, as security forces often fail to distinguish civilians from PKK members.13 How is the situation today? An estimated 12–20 million Kurds live in Turkey, making up approximately 14–23% of the country's population. The wide range in estimates is due to the absence of ethnicity-related data in official statistics and the social and political stigma that may lead some to conceal their identity.14 As Kurds originate from various countries, most today identify with the state in which they reside. Surveys suggest that many Kurds feel a strong sense of discrimination. Only 28% believe they are treated equally to ethnic Turks, while 58% report experiencing discrimination. Some have even been denied medical services and housing due to their ethnicity.15 To better understand these challenges, we spoke with a Kurdish individual from Elbistan, Turkey, who spent most of his life there before relocating. When asked if he had ever felt pressure speaking Kurdish in public, he recalled visits to public institutions where his family, unable to speak Turkish, had to use Kurdish, but were not allowed to. “It always made us feel fear and anxiety”, he said. He also described restrictions on Kurdish culture: “Whenever we listened to Kurdish music or played traditional games outside, we knew we were being watched. Some of my friends were even detained just for playing games with Kurdish music. It felt like our culture was a crime.” In contrast, a Turkish conservative nationalist offered a different perspective. While personally holding nationalist views, he answered the questions in general terms, arguing that Kurds are integrated into society and do not face systemic barriers. When asked if there was tension between Turks and Kurds in daily life, he dismissed the idea: “Generalizing Turkey’s sociology is difficult, but I don’t see any real barrier. I have Kurdish friends and colleagues, and background doesn’t matter to us. In cities like Istanbul, people aren’t judged based on race, religion, language, or culture.” Even though he acknowledged past discrimination, he viewed it as a historical issue rather than an ongoing one. While the two perspectives differ, they reflect broader discussions on the extent of cultural and linguistic inclusion in Turkey. Surveys suggest that many Kurds report experiencing discrimination, while some view Kurdish cultural expression as unrestricted. The extent to which Kurdish identity is freely expressed - or whether challenges remain - continues to be a subject of debate. The survival of Kurdish culture in Turkey In a survey conducted regarding Kurdish identity, only 30% of Kurds reported their Kurdish language skills to be “good”, and of this 30%, only 44% of them reported that their children had the same strong language skills.16 This suggests that it is harder for each passing generation to maintain and teach the Kurdish language. So how has the oppression impacted Kurdish ability to maintain their language? According to the latter interviewee “Kurdish is spoken openly, cultural traditions are practiced, and there are Kurdish-language newspapers and TV channels”. Media As mentioned above, the Turkish government continuously violates the “freedom of expression”. In 2021, Turkey was the country with most cases regarding violation to “freedom of expression” before the European Court of Human Rights.17 Regarding Kurdish media, there has been a consistent crackdown on Kurdish media platforms. There has also been consistent imprisonment of journalists either writing in Kurdish or regarding Kurdish repression. For instance, Nedim Turfent was sentenced to 8 years imprisonment in 2017 for covering the clashes between the Turkish army and the PKK. In his sentence, he was charged with “membership of a terrorist organization”.18 Education The Educational accessibility to teaching Kurdish has improved in the years. Students in cities with a high population of Kurds, can choose Kurdish as a subject in primary- and secondary school. In addition, some state level universities offer Kurdish programs. However, these educational means have been greatly criticized by Kurdish activists, in regard to the government lowering the quality of education by not supplying enough teachers and appropriate materials needed for the classes.19 Final remarks Language is not just a means of communication; it embodies history, culture, and identity. The Kurdish struggle for linguistic freedom in Turkey is a fight for existence, where legal barriers and social stigmas persist despite claims of progress. While the government insists on inclusivity, Kurdish activists highlight ongoing repression, and for many, fear and anxiety remain. The future of Kurdish identity depends not just on legal reforms but on broader acceptance within Turkish society. Whether true equality is within reach - or remains a distant hope - ultimately depends on who you ask.
Av Injuria 24. april 2025
I denne utgaven: Nordtveit, Ernst - " Rettar til nausttomt " - 1982