Ung, ubekymret og arveløs

Injuria.no • 7. oktober 2019

Tekst: Marie Helene Malnes, saksbehandler i Jusformidlingen 

Det er nå gått fem år siden Arvelovutvalget kom med sitt forslag til ny arvelov. Utvalgets mandat gikk ut på å foreta et oversyn over arveloven for å sikre en tidsmessig og balansert lovgivning. Dette på bakgrunn av at blant annet ekteskapet ikke lenger den enerådende samlivsformen. [1] Når Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet og Justiskomitéen likevel har valgt og se bort fra de endringene som ville styrket samboers arverett, virker det som de har glemt nettopp dette. Den nye arveloven er heller en stadfesting av ekteskapets posisjon.  

Slik reglene om samboeres arverett står i dag er det kun de samboere som har, har hatt eller venter barn sammen som har en automatisk rett til arv. Denne gruppen samboere har rett til en arv tilsvarende fire ganger grunnbeløpet (4G). [2] Per i dag ligger grunnbeløpet på kr. 96 883 per år. [3] De samboere som ikke har felles barn, kan etter 5 år fastsette arverett for samboeren i testamentet.

Det er riktig som mandatet uttrykker, ekteskapet er ikke lenger den enerådende samlivsformen. Antall par som gifter seg blir færre, mens antall par som lever i samboerforhold øker. En del av denne gruppen er samboerpar uten barn. Helt siden vedtakelsen av de første reglene om samboere i arveloven har denne gruppen stått uten lovfestet rett til arv. Forslaget som skal fremmes for Stortinget den 9.mai viderefører regelen. 

Unge mennesker i etableringsfasen er en stor andel av samboere i dag. I aldersgruppen 24-34 er nesten 40 % samboere. [4] Et typisk eksempel fra denne gruppen er et ungt og ubekymret samboerpar, der en av partene sitter på verdier som bolig og bil som den andre tar i bruk når paret flytter sammen. Tanken på at en skal falle fra er fjern og det er ikke naturlig å planlegge økonomiske konsekvenser av dødsfall så tidlig i livet. Tanker om testamentet er noe som tilhører fremtiden. Etter noen år begynner de å planlegge en fremtid sammen, men i en hektisk hverdag med jobb og studier er det trangt om både tid og penger til bryllup, og planene blir satt på vent. Hva blir da konsekvensene hvis den som eier både leilighet og bil brått dør? I følge Stortingets justiskomité skal den gjenlevende parten bli sittende igjen uten noe. Arven går til foreldre eller søsken til fordel for partneren den avdøde valgte og tilbringe livet med.

Arveutvalget foreslo at de som har vært registrerte samboere i 5 år eller mer, skulle ha likestilte arverettigheter som gifte par med felleseie. [5] Det er denne regelen som er sett bort fra når Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet og Stortingets justiskomité har gått gjennom forslaget.

Et argument for å gå bort fra en slik regel er at samboere i dag ikke representerer en homogen gruppe. Det er derfor vanskelig å utforme bestemmelser som vil være en god løsning for alle. Jussformidlingen mener at dette er en for snever tankegang. Få som velger å leve sammen vil tenke at dersom en faller fra skal den som sitter igjen være uten noen form for økonomisk trygghet.

I forslaget fra Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet reises det spørsmål om utgangspunktet etter loven burde være arverett for samboere, som kan fravikes ved testament. [6] Ved en slik løsning vil utgangspunktet bli det motsatte av hva det er i dag. Regelen blir da at samboere må ta et aktivt valg dersom vedkommende ønsker at samboeren ikke skal ha en arverett.

På denne måten vil det gjenlevende samboer opparbeide seg en rett til arv dersom det foreligger et stabilt samliv. Løsningen blir ikke nærmere diskutert i forslaget, da ingen av de det er innhentet høringsuttalelser fra har tatt til ordet for en slik ordning. Med tanke på hvor lang tid det tar å utforme innstillinger og vedta lover, er det problematisk at løsningen ikke blir nærmere vurdert.

De bestemmelsene som finnes i dagens arvelov kom inn så sent som i 2008. Allerede da var samboerskap en etablert samlivsform som sårt trengte regulering. Forslaget om revidering av arveloven fra Arvelovutvalget kom på bordet i 2014 mens regjeringens forslag ble lagt frem i 2018. Først i april i år kom Stortingets Justiskomité med sitt forslag. Prosessen for å kunne vedta en ny arvelov er altså inne i sitt femte år.

Det er godt at det tar tid å vedta nye lover. Det at det foretas en omfattende kvalitetssikring og at det innhentes uttalelser fra relevante parter står sentralt i en slik prosess. På bakgrunn av dette er det kritisk når ikke relevante forslag, slik som den omvendte testamentsretten, vurderes tilstrekkelig. Sett i lys av utviklingen som har skjedd de siste tiårene, der samboerne blir flere og flere, er det klart at rettigheter tilknyttet samlivsformen vil bli et tilbakevendende tema. Ettersom en reform er langt på overtid er det ekstra skuffende at et forslag ikke legger til rette for unge samboende.

[1]  NOU 2014:1 – Ny arvelov, s.9

[2] Se Arvelova § 28 b

[3] https://www.nav.no/no/NAV+og+samfunn/Kontakt+NAV/Utbetalinger/Grunnbelopet+i+folketrygden, lest 02.05.19

[5] NOU 2014:1 – Ny Arvelov, s. 51

[6] Prop. 107 L – Lov om arv og dødsboskifte(arveloven), s. 68


 

 

Av Hannah M. Behncke, Eylül Sahin and Sabrina Eriksen Zapata – ELSA Bergen, Human Rights, Researchgruppen 24. april 2025
Oppression isn’t always loud - it can be the quiet erasure of culture and language, stripping minorities of their freedom to express who they are. Language and culture are two of the most important means to keep one's identity alive. Unfortunately, many minorities face extreme repression regarding their background. The Kurdish ability to perform their culture in Turkey has been a long struggle. This is still the case today, where the Kurdish minority face backlash for speaking their language. This article will look into the Kurdish fight to protect their identity in Turkey. To gain a deeper understanding of the diverse perspectives on this issue, we interviewed a Kurdish and a Turkish citizen of Turkey about their views on the Turkish state's treatment of Kurds. Legal basis Although several international legal frameworks exist to protect minority cultures and languages, Turkey has not incorporated them into its legal system. Article 27 of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights explicitly states that “minorities shall not be denied the right […] to enjoy their culture, [...] or to use their own language.” However, despite ratifying the ICCPR, Turkey made a reservation excluding Article 27. Similarly, the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages requires minority languages to be accessible in education, judicial court proceedings, and in the media. However, Turkey has not ratified this charter. Domestically, the Turkish constitution does not recognize Kurds as a minority. In fact, article 42 explicitly prohibits the “teaching of any language other than Turkish as a mother tongue to Turkish citizens”.1 As a result, the Kurdish language lacks legal protection, unlike Ladino, Greek, and Armenian, which are safeguarded under the Treaty of Lausanne (1923).2 Historical overview After the Ottoman Empire's collapse, the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres promised Kurdish autonomy, but the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne nullified it, dividing Kurdistan among Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria without self-rule.3 Under Atatürk, Turkey enforced homogenization, banning Kurdish in public, closing Kurdish schools, renaming villages (1924) and forcibly relocating Kurds—even though most Kurds did not speak Turkish.4 The state criminalized Kurdish, promoted Citizen, Speak Turkish! and justified relocations as a tool to suppress identity.5 The Sheikh Sa’id Rebellion (1925), led by Kurdish nationalists and Islamists, was brutally crushed, triggering long-term conflict. Martial law and mass deportations lasted until 1939, while uprisings in Ararat (1930) and Dersim (1937–38) faced massacres, bombings, and poison gas, drawing parallels to the Armenian Genocide.6 Allegations of British support for Kurdish rebels persist, but remain debated.7 Kurdish political movements resurfaced in the 1960s and 1970s, with the Kurdish Democratic Party of Turkey (1965) and the Marxist-Leninist PKK (1978) engaging in armed resistance. Turkey designated the PKK a terrorist group in 1997, followed by the US and EU.8 Forced displacement continued, with over a million Kurds migrating between 1950 and 1980 due to state violence and poverty.9 The 1980 military coup further suppressed Kurdish politics, banning education (1982) and publications (Law No. 2932, 1983).10 Despite lifting the language ban in 1991, Kurdish broadcasting remained illegal until 2002. From 1984 to 1999, Turkey destroyed 4,000 Kurdish villages, displaced three million people, and killed tens of thousands in its campaign against Kurdish insurgency.11 The 1991 language bill allowed limited private Kurdish use, but public use remained restricted. Some progress followed in the 21st century, including Kurdish-language broadcasts (2004), a state-run TV channel (2009), and Kurdish as an optional school subject (2012), though full linguistic and cultural rights remain elusive. Oral storytelling (Dengbêj) persisted despite restrictions. Between 2013 and 2015, Turkey’s peace talks with the PKK, involving Abdullah Öcalan, PKK commanders, and pro-Kurdish HDP intermediaries, collapsed—renewing conflict in southeastern Turkey.12 Arbitrary arrests, imprisonment, torture, and land dispossession persist, as security forces often fail to distinguish civilians from PKK members.13 How is the situation today? An estimated 12–20 million Kurds live in Turkey, making up approximately 14–23% of the country's population. The wide range in estimates is due to the absence of ethnicity-related data in official statistics and the social and political stigma that may lead some to conceal their identity.14 As Kurds originate from various countries, most today identify with the state in which they reside. Surveys suggest that many Kurds feel a strong sense of discrimination. Only 28% believe they are treated equally to ethnic Turks, while 58% report experiencing discrimination. Some have even been denied medical services and housing due to their ethnicity.15 To better understand these challenges, we spoke with a Kurdish individual from Elbistan, Turkey, who spent most of his life there before relocating. When asked if he had ever felt pressure speaking Kurdish in public, he recalled visits to public institutions where his family, unable to speak Turkish, had to use Kurdish, but were not allowed to. “It always made us feel fear and anxiety”, he said. He also described restrictions on Kurdish culture: “Whenever we listened to Kurdish music or played traditional games outside, we knew we were being watched. Some of my friends were even detained just for playing games with Kurdish music. It felt like our culture was a crime.” In contrast, a Turkish conservative nationalist offered a different perspective. While personally holding nationalist views, he answered the questions in general terms, arguing that Kurds are integrated into society and do not face systemic barriers. When asked if there was tension between Turks and Kurds in daily life, he dismissed the idea: “Generalizing Turkey’s sociology is difficult, but I don’t see any real barrier. I have Kurdish friends and colleagues, and background doesn’t matter to us. In cities like Istanbul, people aren’t judged based on race, religion, language, or culture.” Even though he acknowledged past discrimination, he viewed it as a historical issue rather than an ongoing one. While the two perspectives differ, they reflect broader discussions on the extent of cultural and linguistic inclusion in Turkey. Surveys suggest that many Kurds report experiencing discrimination, while some view Kurdish cultural expression as unrestricted. The extent to which Kurdish identity is freely expressed - or whether challenges remain - continues to be a subject of debate. The survival of Kurdish culture in Turkey In a survey conducted regarding Kurdish identity, only 30% of Kurds reported their Kurdish language skills to be “good”, and of this 30%, only 44% of them reported that their children had the same strong language skills.16 This suggests that it is harder for each passing generation to maintain and teach the Kurdish language. So how has the oppression impacted Kurdish ability to maintain their language? According to the latter interviewee “Kurdish is spoken openly, cultural traditions are practiced, and there are Kurdish-language newspapers and TV channels”. Media As mentioned above, the Turkish government continuously violates the “freedom of expression”. In 2021, Turkey was the country with most cases regarding violation to “freedom of expression” before the European Court of Human Rights.17 Regarding Kurdish media, there has been a consistent crackdown on Kurdish media platforms. There has also been consistent imprisonment of journalists either writing in Kurdish or regarding Kurdish repression. For instance, Nedim Turfent was sentenced to 8 years imprisonment in 2017 for covering the clashes between the Turkish army and the PKK. In his sentence, he was charged with “membership of a terrorist organization”.18 Education The Educational accessibility to teaching Kurdish has improved in the years. Students in cities with a high population of Kurds, can choose Kurdish as a subject in primary- and secondary school. In addition, some state level universities offer Kurdish programs. However, these educational means have been greatly criticized by Kurdish activists, in regard to the government lowering the quality of education by not supplying enough teachers and appropriate materials needed for the classes.19 Final remarks Language is not just a means of communication; it embodies history, culture, and identity. The Kurdish struggle for linguistic freedom in Turkey is a fight for existence, where legal barriers and social stigmas persist despite claims of progress. While the government insists on inclusivity, Kurdish activists highlight ongoing repression, and for many, fear and anxiety remain. The future of Kurdish identity depends not just on legal reforms but on broader acceptance within Turkish society. Whether true equality is within reach - or remains a distant hope - ultimately depends on who you ask.
Av Injuria 24. april 2025
I denne utgaven: Nordtveit, Ernst - " Rettar til nausttomt " - 1982