Motsvar til Håkons Leths debattinnlegg i Injuria

Injuria.no • 27. november 2017

Av: Karl Harald Søvig (dekan ved Det juridiske fakultet, UiB)
 

Det juridiske fakultet er gjort kjent med et innlegg i Injuria 4/17, der enkelte påstander og antakelser om fakultetet er presentert. Vi skal ikke gå inn på vurderinger og konklusjoner, men ser behov for enkelte oppklaringer der det synes å foreligge misforståelser.

Vårt studieprogram er på 300 studiepoeng, hvorav 240 er obligatoriske emner. Det siste året – 60 studiepoeng – kan studentene bruke til å forfølge sine individuelle interesser. Vi har ingen prinsipielle motforestillinger mot å ha mer valgfrihet i studiet. Dette er imidlertid en avveiing mot hensynet til at vi er et profesjonsstudium. I motsetning til mange andre studier, er jusstudiet et lovbestemt vilkår for å gå inn i rettspleien i Norge. Dette setter rammer for hva studiet hos oss kan inneholde – og hva vi kan «klare oss uten». Vi ser likevel muligheten for å utvide valgfriheten noe. Temaet er alltid aktuelt når vi vurderer helheten i studieordningen vår.

Fakultetet legger mye arbeid og omtanke i å designe et studium som skal gi et best mulig faglig utbytte, og i å guide studentene gjennom dette. At dette skjer på bekostning av noen som ikke har kommet inn hos oss, kan vi ikke helt se. Her skal det også nevnes at vi har 30 studieplasser i et toårig masterprogram, som er reservert for ferdige bachelorer i jus fra Universitetet i Stavanger, Universitetet i Agder og Høgskolen i Innlandet, som nettopp har «bevist at de kan studere jus». Dersom Kunnskapsdepartementet og Stortinget finner å ville tildele oss flere slike studieplasser, vil vi ta imot det med stor begeistring – det er ikke oss dette stopper på.

Det er bare delvis riktig at man må ta opp igjen emner hos oss hvis man kommer hit fra jusstudiet i Oslo: Hvis man har første og andre år fra Oslo, går man rett inn på tredje år hos oss. Hvis man også har tredje og fjerde år fra Oslo, går man rett inn på femte år hos oss. Hvis man imidlertid har noen andre kombinasjoner av emner fra Oslo, vil vi designe en mer nøyaktig utdanningsplan ved innpassingen, og der vil noe måtte gjøres om igjen her. Det er riktig at vi i denne sammenhengen følger et regelverk vi har laget selv. Det er fakultetet som fastlegger det faglige innholdet i studiet her, og har ansvaret for det.

Vi vil også gjerne oppklare en misforståelse med hensyn til studierettene hos oss: I tillegg til studierett til programmene våre og den spesielle studieretten våre innreisende studenter fra utlandet får, har vi to ytterligere tilbud: Det ene er poststudieretten, som vi har hatt siden 2014. Denne har ikke vært endret siden den ble opprettet, og den representerer ikke – og har ikke representert – noe «smutthull». Den er reservert våre egne ferdige kandidater.

I tillegg har vi en særskilt studierett til spesialemner. Denne representerer en lang tradisjon hos oss med å invitere personer som ikke er del av jusstudiet, til å ta del i noe av vårt faglige tilbud. I nåværende form har vi hatt denne studieretten siden høsten 2013. Her kreves som hovedregel bare en bachelorgrad eller tilsvarende , men noen emner har i tillegg egne forkunnskapskrav. Dette er ikke et «smutthull», men tvert imot et godt publisert tilbud: Hjemmesiden til Det Juridiske fakultet > Utdanning > Opptak ved Det juridiske fakultet > spesialemner og tilleggsutdanning.

Vi er heller ikke kjent med grunnlaget for opplysningen om at universitetet i Århus «faktisk nekter å merittere enkelte emner fra UiB». Vi har aldri søkt Århus om noe slags «merittering» av våre emner. Vi er heller ikke kjent med at enkeltstudenter skal ha gjort det, men det kan selvsagt godt være. Vi har sett på hvilke kriterier Århus har for opptak til bachelorstudiet og til masterstudiet («kandidatuddannelse») i jus. For tilgang til bachelorstudiet er det vilkår sammenlignbare med våre [1] – i tillegg til at Århus har en innledende prøve i begynnelsen av studiet, og visse krav til måloppnåelse på første år for å få fortsette [2].

For masterstudiet er kravet «en bestået dansk eller ligestillet juridisk bacheloruddannelse» [3]. Stikkordet her er altså «ligestillet juridisk bacheloruddannelse». Det er den enkelte institusjon – i Danmark så vel som i Norge – som gjør vurderingen av hva som er «ligestillet». Vi noterer at Høgskolen i Sørøst-Norge (HSN) har en samarbeidsavtale med universitetet i Århus om «sømløs overgang» for deres bachelorkandidater til masterstudiet i Århus [4]. Dette ser vi som utelukkende gledelig – formodentlig for alle parter. Vi har imidlertid ikke sett det behovet som HSN har hatt – hovedsakelig fordi vi allerede har et tilbud om mastergrad til våre studenter.

Til slutt noterer vi oss at Leth påpeker manglende serviceinnstilling. Vi skal være de første til å beklage dersom vi ikke har lykkes i å leve opp til studentenes forventninger. Vi er imidlertid ikke sikker på hvilke ledd som kan ha sviktet i dette konkrete tilfellet, og imøteser eventuelt en utdyping av dette. Vi kan forsikre at vi har et omfattende apparat i sving hver dag for å yte service. Vi tilbyr også en viss fleksibilitet, men aldri på bekostning av faglige krav, og – dessverre – delvis begrenset av gitte ressursrammer.

 


[1] Bekendtgørelse om adgang til bacheloruddannelser ved universiteterne og
[2] Se pkt. 3.3 her STUDIEORDNING FOR BACHELORUDDANNELSEN I JURA (2017)
og § 16 her: Bekendtgørelse om adgang til bacheloruddannelser ved universiteterne.
[3] STUDIEORDNING FOR KANDIDATUDDANNELSEN I JURA (2015)
[4] Aarhus-master for jusstudentene, 31.03.2016, hjemmesiden til Høgskolen i Sørøst-Norge

 

 

Av Hannah M. Behncke, Eylül Sahin and Sabrina Eriksen Zapata – ELSA Bergen, Human Rights, Researchgruppen 24. april 2025
Oppression isn’t always loud - it can be the quiet erasure of culture and language, stripping minorities of their freedom to express who they are. Language and culture are two of the most important means to keep one's identity alive. Unfortunately, many minorities face extreme repression regarding their background. The Kurdish ability to perform their culture in Turkey has been a long struggle. This is still the case today, where the Kurdish minority face backlash for speaking their language. This article will look into the Kurdish fight to protect their identity in Turkey. To gain a deeper understanding of the diverse perspectives on this issue, we interviewed a Kurdish and a Turkish citizen of Turkey about their views on the Turkish state's treatment of Kurds. Legal basis Although several international legal frameworks exist to protect minority cultures and languages, Turkey has not incorporated them into its legal system. Article 27 of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights explicitly states that “minorities shall not be denied the right […] to enjoy their culture, [...] or to use their own language.” However, despite ratifying the ICCPR, Turkey made a reservation excluding Article 27. Similarly, the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages requires minority languages to be accessible in education, judicial court proceedings, and in the media. However, Turkey has not ratified this charter. Domestically, the Turkish constitution does not recognize Kurds as a minority. In fact, article 42 explicitly prohibits the “teaching of any language other than Turkish as a mother tongue to Turkish citizens”.1 As a result, the Kurdish language lacks legal protection, unlike Ladino, Greek, and Armenian, which are safeguarded under the Treaty of Lausanne (1923).2 Historical overview After the Ottoman Empire's collapse, the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres promised Kurdish autonomy, but the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne nullified it, dividing Kurdistan among Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria without self-rule.3 Under Atatürk, Turkey enforced homogenization, banning Kurdish in public, closing Kurdish schools, renaming villages (1924) and forcibly relocating Kurds—even though most Kurds did not speak Turkish.4 The state criminalized Kurdish, promoted Citizen, Speak Turkish! and justified relocations as a tool to suppress identity.5 The Sheikh Sa’id Rebellion (1925), led by Kurdish nationalists and Islamists, was brutally crushed, triggering long-term conflict. Martial law and mass deportations lasted until 1939, while uprisings in Ararat (1930) and Dersim (1937–38) faced massacres, bombings, and poison gas, drawing parallels to the Armenian Genocide.6 Allegations of British support for Kurdish rebels persist, but remain debated.7 Kurdish political movements resurfaced in the 1960s and 1970s, with the Kurdish Democratic Party of Turkey (1965) and the Marxist-Leninist PKK (1978) engaging in armed resistance. Turkey designated the PKK a terrorist group in 1997, followed by the US and EU.8 Forced displacement continued, with over a million Kurds migrating between 1950 and 1980 due to state violence and poverty.9 The 1980 military coup further suppressed Kurdish politics, banning education (1982) and publications (Law No. 2932, 1983).10 Despite lifting the language ban in 1991, Kurdish broadcasting remained illegal until 2002. From 1984 to 1999, Turkey destroyed 4,000 Kurdish villages, displaced three million people, and killed tens of thousands in its campaign against Kurdish insurgency.11 The 1991 language bill allowed limited private Kurdish use, but public use remained restricted. Some progress followed in the 21st century, including Kurdish-language broadcasts (2004), a state-run TV channel (2009), and Kurdish as an optional school subject (2012), though full linguistic and cultural rights remain elusive. Oral storytelling (Dengbêj) persisted despite restrictions. Between 2013 and 2015, Turkey’s peace talks with the PKK, involving Abdullah Öcalan, PKK commanders, and pro-Kurdish HDP intermediaries, collapsed—renewing conflict in southeastern Turkey.12 Arbitrary arrests, imprisonment, torture, and land dispossession persist, as security forces often fail to distinguish civilians from PKK members.13 How is the situation today? An estimated 12–20 million Kurds live in Turkey, making up approximately 14–23% of the country's population. The wide range in estimates is due to the absence of ethnicity-related data in official statistics and the social and political stigma that may lead some to conceal their identity.14 As Kurds originate from various countries, most today identify with the state in which they reside. Surveys suggest that many Kurds feel a strong sense of discrimination. Only 28% believe they are treated equally to ethnic Turks, while 58% report experiencing discrimination. Some have even been denied medical services and housing due to their ethnicity.15 To better understand these challenges, we spoke with a Kurdish individual from Elbistan, Turkey, who spent most of his life there before relocating. When asked if he had ever felt pressure speaking Kurdish in public, he recalled visits to public institutions where his family, unable to speak Turkish, had to use Kurdish, but were not allowed to. “It always made us feel fear and anxiety”, he said. He also described restrictions on Kurdish culture: “Whenever we listened to Kurdish music or played traditional games outside, we knew we were being watched. Some of my friends were even detained just for playing games with Kurdish music. It felt like our culture was a crime.” In contrast, a Turkish conservative nationalist offered a different perspective. While personally holding nationalist views, he answered the questions in general terms, arguing that Kurds are integrated into society and do not face systemic barriers. When asked if there was tension between Turks and Kurds in daily life, he dismissed the idea: “Generalizing Turkey’s sociology is difficult, but I don’t see any real barrier. I have Kurdish friends and colleagues, and background doesn’t matter to us. In cities like Istanbul, people aren’t judged based on race, religion, language, or culture.” Even though he acknowledged past discrimination, he viewed it as a historical issue rather than an ongoing one. While the two perspectives differ, they reflect broader discussions on the extent of cultural and linguistic inclusion in Turkey. Surveys suggest that many Kurds report experiencing discrimination, while some view Kurdish cultural expression as unrestricted. The extent to which Kurdish identity is freely expressed - or whether challenges remain - continues to be a subject of debate. The survival of Kurdish culture in Turkey In a survey conducted regarding Kurdish identity, only 30% of Kurds reported their Kurdish language skills to be “good”, and of this 30%, only 44% of them reported that their children had the same strong language skills.16 This suggests that it is harder for each passing generation to maintain and teach the Kurdish language. So how has the oppression impacted Kurdish ability to maintain their language? According to the latter interviewee “Kurdish is spoken openly, cultural traditions are practiced, and there are Kurdish-language newspapers and TV channels”. Media As mentioned above, the Turkish government continuously violates the “freedom of expression”. In 2021, Turkey was the country with most cases regarding violation to “freedom of expression” before the European Court of Human Rights.17 Regarding Kurdish media, there has been a consistent crackdown on Kurdish media platforms. There has also been consistent imprisonment of journalists either writing in Kurdish or regarding Kurdish repression. For instance, Nedim Turfent was sentenced to 8 years imprisonment in 2017 for covering the clashes between the Turkish army and the PKK. In his sentence, he was charged with “membership of a terrorist organization”.18 Education The Educational accessibility to teaching Kurdish has improved in the years. Students in cities with a high population of Kurds, can choose Kurdish as a subject in primary- and secondary school. In addition, some state level universities offer Kurdish programs. However, these educational means have been greatly criticized by Kurdish activists, in regard to the government lowering the quality of education by not supplying enough teachers and appropriate materials needed for the classes.19 Final remarks Language is not just a means of communication; it embodies history, culture, and identity. The Kurdish struggle for linguistic freedom in Turkey is a fight for existence, where legal barriers and social stigmas persist despite claims of progress. While the government insists on inclusivity, Kurdish activists highlight ongoing repression, and for many, fear and anxiety remain. The future of Kurdish identity depends not just on legal reforms but on broader acceptance within Turkish society. Whether true equality is within reach - or remains a distant hope - ultimately depends on who you ask.
Av Injuria 24. april 2025
I denne utgaven: Nordtveit, Ernst - " Rettar til nausttomt " - 1982