Leserinnlegg: Fengselets usikre fremtid fra et rettspolitisk synspunkt

Injuria.no • 24. februar 2018

Skrevet av Ole Grønvold Eriksen og Thea Marie Hansen fra Wayback Bergen 

På slutten av fjoråret besluttet regjeringen å kutte i Kriminalomsorgens budsjetter. Dette fikk stor oppmerksomhet i media, som gikk langt i å hevde at regjeringen sløser med fengselspengene. Senest 22. Januar hørte vi på nytt at Kriminalomsorgen måtte kutte, denne gangen i fengselsplasser ved nedleggelse av Ulvsnesøy, et åpent fengsel utenfor Bergen.

Spørsmålet vi i WayBack stiller oss nå er hvilke konsekvenser regjeringens kutt i Kriminalomsorgens budsjetter har for fengselets ansatte og innsatte, og hvilke utfordringer norske fengsler står overfor i fremtiden.  

WayBack er en uavhengig stiftelse som arbeider for at straffedømte kan leve et liv uten kriminalitet og rusmisbruk. Stiftelsen retter sin innsats særlig mot løslatelsesfasen og tiden etter fengselsoppholdet. Formålet er at tidligere straffedømte integreres i samfunn og arbeidsliv, og dermed klarer å bli aktive og ansvarsfulle samfunnsborgere. Stiftelsen har en egen gruppe bestående av frivillige jusstudenter fra UIB som yter gratis rettshjelp til innsatte, samt rettspolitisk arbeid. WayBack Bergen teller i dag 28 medarbeidere. Samtlige er klarert for fengselsbesøk og driver vårt sevicetilbud- i og utenfor fengsel - året rundt.   

Færre ansatte i norske fengsler.
Aftenposten skrev i en kronikk den 4 desember om at antall ansatte i norske fengsel var på et farlig lavt nivå.   

Også Bergens Tidene skrev den 9 desember en kronikk om at ansatte må stole på de innsatte dersom noe skulle gå galt.  

Tendensen er klar. Det blir stadig færre ansatte i norske fengsler til enhver tid. Det betyr at det blir mindre tid til å passe på, holde kontakt med og drive rehabilitering til de innsatte. En endring som raskt kan få store negative konsekvenser dersom de ansatte må stole på at kriminelle vil beskytte de ansatte dersom en uheldig situasjon skulle oppstå.  

Færre tilbud til de innsatte.
Som en direkte konsekvens av færre ansatte i fengselet til enhver tid, blir det langt mindre tid til rehabiliterende arbeid innenfor fengselsmurene. Spørsmålet vi i WayBack stiller oss er hvilken direkte og indirekte konsekvens dette vil få for fengselets innsatte.   

Med økonomiske kutt følger også færre fritidstilbud. Det medfører at de innsatte ikke bare straffes med frihetsberøvelse, men fengsles med svært få sosiale tilbud under oppholdet.  

Den største konsekvens WayBack nå mener innsatte blir utsatt for, er økt bruk av isolasjon som en følge av manglende ansatte.  

Norge er kjent for å være kritisert for sin bruk av isolasjon. Et problem som nå står for tur som Wayback ser det, er at økt bruk av isolasjon i verste fall kan resultere i brudd på Grunnloven § 93 (2) og EMK art. 3 om «umenneskelig eller nedverdigende behandling». Den økte bruken av isolasjon som begrunnes i blant annet manglende ansatte vil kunne føre til enda større samfunnsmessige utfordringer, nemlig psykiske soningsskader. For vi må alle huske at investering i rehabiliterende fengselsdrift er en fordel for samfunnet for øvrig, da den innsatte en dag vil være din nabo.  

Et mer lukket fengsel.
WayBack har vært i kontakt med en tidligere innsatt som har sonet en 3 ½ års fengselsstraff. Vedkommende gir klart uttrykk for at dagens soning er et “cellefengsel” hvor innsatte stadig bruker mer av sin tid innelåst på celler som følge av regjeringens kutt til Kriminalomsorgen. Vedkommende gir klart uttrykk for et ønske om mer åpne fengsler hvor innsatte blir stimulert sosialt under fengselsoppholdet, i lys av faren for soningsskader. Virkeligheten er likevel en annen. Nylig har det blitt kjent at Ulvsnesøy fengsel skal legges ned før sommeren 2019, når leiekontrakten utløper med Ulvsensøy skolehjem.  

Ulvsnesøy er en avdeling hvor det er åpen soning og de innsatte aktiviseres, både i øyens arbeid og sosialt. Det er som kjent ikke bare et fengsel for menn, men også for kvinner. Med nedleggelsen av Ulvsnesøy kan en rette fokuset over på de kvinnelige innsatte i norske fengsler og se hvilke tilbud de i fremtiden vil få. Svaret på spørsmålet er slik WayBack ser det klart. De kvinnelige innsatte er de som vil lide mest av de økonomiske kuttene Kriminalomsorgen står overfor, nettopp når “cellefengsler” i Bergen fengsel eller Bredtveit kvinnefengsel er de eneste soningstilbudene. Og ja, de innsatte er dømt til frihetsberøvelse, men ikke til å sone under dårlige forhold. Kvinnene har i 2018 helt klart krav på de samme rettigheter som menn, også når det kommer til soningsforhold.  

Wayback jobber derfor rettspolitisk for å kunne sette problematikken på dagsorden, for å belyse at investering i soningsforhold er en investering i samfunnet generelt..

Av Hannah M. Behncke, Eylül Sahin and Sabrina Eriksen Zapata – ELSA Bergen, Human Rights, Researchgruppen 24. april 2025
Oppression isn’t always loud - it can be the quiet erasure of culture and language, stripping minorities of their freedom to express who they are. Language and culture are two of the most important means to keep one's identity alive. Unfortunately, many minorities face extreme repression regarding their background. The Kurdish ability to perform their culture in Turkey has been a long struggle. This is still the case today, where the Kurdish minority face backlash for speaking their language. This article will look into the Kurdish fight to protect their identity in Turkey. To gain a deeper understanding of the diverse perspectives on this issue, we interviewed a Kurdish and a Turkish citizen of Turkey about their views on the Turkish state's treatment of Kurds. Legal basis Although several international legal frameworks exist to protect minority cultures and languages, Turkey has not incorporated them into its legal system. Article 27 of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights explicitly states that “minorities shall not be denied the right […] to enjoy their culture, [...] or to use their own language.” However, despite ratifying the ICCPR, Turkey made a reservation excluding Article 27. Similarly, the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages requires minority languages to be accessible in education, judicial court proceedings, and in the media. However, Turkey has not ratified this charter. Domestically, the Turkish constitution does not recognize Kurds as a minority. In fact, article 42 explicitly prohibits the “teaching of any language other than Turkish as a mother tongue to Turkish citizens”.1 As a result, the Kurdish language lacks legal protection, unlike Ladino, Greek, and Armenian, which are safeguarded under the Treaty of Lausanne (1923).2 Historical overview After the Ottoman Empire's collapse, the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres promised Kurdish autonomy, but the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne nullified it, dividing Kurdistan among Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria without self-rule.3 Under Atatürk, Turkey enforced homogenization, banning Kurdish in public, closing Kurdish schools, renaming villages (1924) and forcibly relocating Kurds—even though most Kurds did not speak Turkish.4 The state criminalized Kurdish, promoted Citizen, Speak Turkish! and justified relocations as a tool to suppress identity.5 The Sheikh Sa’id Rebellion (1925), led by Kurdish nationalists and Islamists, was brutally crushed, triggering long-term conflict. Martial law and mass deportations lasted until 1939, while uprisings in Ararat (1930) and Dersim (1937–38) faced massacres, bombings, and poison gas, drawing parallels to the Armenian Genocide.6 Allegations of British support for Kurdish rebels persist, but remain debated.7 Kurdish political movements resurfaced in the 1960s and 1970s, with the Kurdish Democratic Party of Turkey (1965) and the Marxist-Leninist PKK (1978) engaging in armed resistance. Turkey designated the PKK a terrorist group in 1997, followed by the US and EU.8 Forced displacement continued, with over a million Kurds migrating between 1950 and 1980 due to state violence and poverty.9 The 1980 military coup further suppressed Kurdish politics, banning education (1982) and publications (Law No. 2932, 1983).10 Despite lifting the language ban in 1991, Kurdish broadcasting remained illegal until 2002. From 1984 to 1999, Turkey destroyed 4,000 Kurdish villages, displaced three million people, and killed tens of thousands in its campaign against Kurdish insurgency.11 The 1991 language bill allowed limited private Kurdish use, but public use remained restricted. Some progress followed in the 21st century, including Kurdish-language broadcasts (2004), a state-run TV channel (2009), and Kurdish as an optional school subject (2012), though full linguistic and cultural rights remain elusive. Oral storytelling (Dengbêj) persisted despite restrictions. Between 2013 and 2015, Turkey’s peace talks with the PKK, involving Abdullah Öcalan, PKK commanders, and pro-Kurdish HDP intermediaries, collapsed—renewing conflict in southeastern Turkey.12 Arbitrary arrests, imprisonment, torture, and land dispossession persist, as security forces often fail to distinguish civilians from PKK members.13 How is the situation today? An estimated 12–20 million Kurds live in Turkey, making up approximately 14–23% of the country's population. The wide range in estimates is due to the absence of ethnicity-related data in official statistics and the social and political stigma that may lead some to conceal their identity.14 As Kurds originate from various countries, most today identify with the state in which they reside. Surveys suggest that many Kurds feel a strong sense of discrimination. Only 28% believe they are treated equally to ethnic Turks, while 58% report experiencing discrimination. Some have even been denied medical services and housing due to their ethnicity.15 To better understand these challenges, we spoke with a Kurdish individual from Elbistan, Turkey, who spent most of his life there before relocating. When asked if he had ever felt pressure speaking Kurdish in public, he recalled visits to public institutions where his family, unable to speak Turkish, had to use Kurdish, but were not allowed to. “It always made us feel fear and anxiety”, he said. He also described restrictions on Kurdish culture: “Whenever we listened to Kurdish music or played traditional games outside, we knew we were being watched. Some of my friends were even detained just for playing games with Kurdish music. It felt like our culture was a crime.” In contrast, a Turkish conservative nationalist offered a different perspective. While personally holding nationalist views, he answered the questions in general terms, arguing that Kurds are integrated into society and do not face systemic barriers. When asked if there was tension between Turks and Kurds in daily life, he dismissed the idea: “Generalizing Turkey’s sociology is difficult, but I don’t see any real barrier. I have Kurdish friends and colleagues, and background doesn’t matter to us. In cities like Istanbul, people aren’t judged based on race, religion, language, or culture.” Even though he acknowledged past discrimination, he viewed it as a historical issue rather than an ongoing one. While the two perspectives differ, they reflect broader discussions on the extent of cultural and linguistic inclusion in Turkey. Surveys suggest that many Kurds report experiencing discrimination, while some view Kurdish cultural expression as unrestricted. The extent to which Kurdish identity is freely expressed - or whether challenges remain - continues to be a subject of debate. The survival of Kurdish culture in Turkey In a survey conducted regarding Kurdish identity, only 30% of Kurds reported their Kurdish language skills to be “good”, and of this 30%, only 44% of them reported that their children had the same strong language skills.16 This suggests that it is harder for each passing generation to maintain and teach the Kurdish language. So how has the oppression impacted Kurdish ability to maintain their language? According to the latter interviewee “Kurdish is spoken openly, cultural traditions are practiced, and there are Kurdish-language newspapers and TV channels”. Media As mentioned above, the Turkish government continuously violates the “freedom of expression”. In 2021, Turkey was the country with most cases regarding violation to “freedom of expression” before the European Court of Human Rights.17 Regarding Kurdish media, there has been a consistent crackdown on Kurdish media platforms. There has also been consistent imprisonment of journalists either writing in Kurdish or regarding Kurdish repression. For instance, Nedim Turfent was sentenced to 8 years imprisonment in 2017 for covering the clashes between the Turkish army and the PKK. In his sentence, he was charged with “membership of a terrorist organization”.18 Education The Educational accessibility to teaching Kurdish has improved in the years. Students in cities with a high population of Kurds, can choose Kurdish as a subject in primary- and secondary school. In addition, some state level universities offer Kurdish programs. However, these educational means have been greatly criticized by Kurdish activists, in regard to the government lowering the quality of education by not supplying enough teachers and appropriate materials needed for the classes.19 Final remarks Language is not just a means of communication; it embodies history, culture, and identity. The Kurdish struggle for linguistic freedom in Turkey is a fight for existence, where legal barriers and social stigmas persist despite claims of progress. While the government insists on inclusivity, Kurdish activists highlight ongoing repression, and for many, fear and anxiety remain. The future of Kurdish identity depends not just on legal reforms but on broader acceptance within Turkish society. Whether true equality is within reach - or remains a distant hope - ultimately depends on who you ask.
Av Injuria 24. april 2025
I denne utgaven: Nordtveit, Ernst - " Rettar til nausttomt " - 1982